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The aim of the paper is to analyze the foreign transmission mechanism between each of the 
Visegrad-4  countries  and  the  eurozone,  through  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  basic 
international parity conditions linking Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian inflations and 
interest rates with the ones of the current euro area members. The focus of the analysis is to 
show the differences among these catching-up economies, with particular attention to their 
process of convergence towards the eurozone economy. For reasons due to the availability of 
data, the sample covers the last decade. We use the cointegrated VAR model to define long-
run stationary relations as well as common stochastic trends. The methodology adopted is 
properly apt to uncover the dynamic structure underlying the stochastic behaviour of prices, 
interest rates and exchange rate. Of particular interest is the empirical finding that the parities 
do not hold on their own, as expected, but that weaker form of the same parities, or linear 
combinations of them, hold in our data set, with some differences for each country. Also the 
process of convergence is different: the Czech Republic seems to have reached a relative 
convergence, while for the other countries we have that the process show a tendency towards 
convergence.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The attention of the paper focuses on the Visegrad-4 countries, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovakia.  Since  their  accession  to  the  European  Union  they  have 
committed themselves to take economic policy decisions which affect the level and stability 
of prices, long-term interest rates, the fiscal position and the nominal exchange rate. In order 
to analyze how the foreign transmission mechanism
1 between each of the four country and the 
Euro area influences the relevant variables for the adoption of Euro, we perform an empirical 
analysis of the basic international parity conditions, such as purchasing power parity (PPP), 
uncovered interest parity (UIP), and real interest parity (RIP), showing also the differences for 
each country in the process of convergence with the current euro area members
2. 
As the empirical literature in international finance has shown, these parities have been 
hardly found to be satisfied on their own, in their strong form. Therefore, we do not expect to 
find  much  evidence  of  them  between  each  of  the  formally  centrally  planned  transition 
economies  and  the  eurozone  economy.  But  the  joint  empirical  analysis  of  the  parity 
conditions,  based  on  the  cointegrated  VAR  model,  is  particularly  apt  to  bring  more 
information on these parity relations and on the linkages between inflations, interest rates and 
real exchange rate, defined as the deviation from long-run PPP condition.  
According to Juselius, MacDonald (2000a), when applying cointegration analysis to a 
system  of  variables  made  up  by  home  and  foreign  inflations,  home  and  foreign  long-run 
interest rates and real exchange rate, we should find two stationary relations combining the 
parities, and three non stationary relations, the common stochastic trends, representing the 
forces driving the system: the first corresponding to a trend in inflation rates, the second a 
trend measuring the relative impact of different monetary policies between the eurozone and 
each country, and the third a trend reflecting the role of the euro as a reserve currency. 
The  question  of  primary  interest  we  would  like  to  address  also,  on  the  basis  of 
empirical  analysis,  is  whether  there  is  any  evidence  that  a  certain  degree  of  sustainable 
economic convergence towards the eurozone economy, has been achieved by the Visegrad-4 
countries. There are three potentially interesting cases that can emerge: the case of absolute 
convergence,  the  case  of  relative  convergence  and  the  case  of  convergence  in  act, 
corresponding to a situation where there are clear signals towards convergence. The idea we 
have is that the case of relative convergence corresponds to a significant constant present in 
the  cointegrating  relations,  implying  an  equilibrium  mean  different  from  zero,  while 
convergence  in  act  corresponds  to  the  case  where  a  significant  trend  is  present  in  the 
cointegration space, implying a linear trend in the levels of the variables, which does not 
cancel in the equilibrium relations, that is, the model contains trend-stationary cointegrating 
relations. 
The structure of the paper is the following. In the second section we discuss briefly the 
parity conditions. In the third, we outline the econometric model with particular attention to 
the deterministic components, constant and trend, which play a particular role in the process 
of convergence. In the fourth, we report the cointegration and weak exogeneity properties of 
the  system  variables  for  each  country,  together  with  the  identified  significant  long-run 
relations, interpreted in terms of the parities. In the fifth, we define the common stochastic 
trends and show the long-run impact of shocks to the system variables. In the final section we  
summarize and draw the conclusions.  
                                                 
1  Égert,  MacDonald  (2006)  surveys  recent  advances  in  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism  with  special 
attention to exploring possible interrelations between different channels, especially they relate to countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
2 Stazka (2008) has performed a similar analysis, but only for Poland and covering the period 1994-2005. Her 
results are quite different from ours.   3 
2.  A brief presentation of international parity conditions 
 
In this section we discuss briefly the international parity conditions we are going to 
analyse in the following of the paper
3. The first one we consider is purchasing power parity, 
which relates the prices of one country to the prices of another country measured in the same 
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where pt
* denotes the price level in the home country, pt the price level in the foreign country, 
et the spot exchange rate (home currency price of a unit of foreign currency), and lower case 
letters denote natural logarithm. An alternative way of expressing the form (9) of the PPP is to 
say that the term: 
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should be a stationary steady state relation. 
The second condition is the uncovered interest parity, which expresses the expected 
change in the exchange rate in terms of the long-term interest rate spread between the two 
countries, as follows: 
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or, with a risk premium term added: 
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If the difference between  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + (D  and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ + D  is stationary and the differenced process 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + -  is stationary, it follows that  ￿ ￿ D  is stationary, which implies that ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -  is 
stationary, unless the term  ￿ ￿ , that is the risk premium, is non stationary. 
The third condition we consider, derived using the Fisher decomposition, is the real 
interest parity, defined as: 
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where  ￿ ￿  is a stationary error term if the condition empirically holds.￿
A testable relation between PPP, which arises from conditions in goods markets, and 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which arises from conditions in capital markets, can be 
derived if we make the plausible assumption (Juselius, 2006, p. 394) that the expected change 
in  future  exchange  rate,  that  is the  expected  depreciation  rate,  is  a  linear  function  of  the 
                                                 
3 A detailed presentation of the international parity conditions can be found in Juselius, MacDonald (2000b, 
2004a, 2004b) and in Juselius (2006). We draw largely from them.   4 
observed inflation rate differential and the deviation from the long-run PPP level, as measured 
by the ppp term. The relation is the following: 
 
(7)  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
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that leads to the empirically testable relation: 
 
(8)  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
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Relation (8) contains all the parity conditions as special cases. 
 
 
3.  The econometric model 
 
In  the  empirical  analysis
4  we  have  assumed  for  the  p  observed  variables  an 
unrestricted  cointegrated  vector  autoregressive  (VAR)  model,  as  in  Johansen  (1996)  and 
Juselius (2006). The model has been augmented to include constants, a trend and intervention 
dummies. It is given by: 
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The hypothesis on the empirical relevance of some stationary parity conditions implies 
the existence of r < p cointegrating relations and therefore a singular matrix P P P P, of reduced 
rank r, which can be rewritten as  P ab P ab P ab P ab = ￿, where a a a a and b b b b are matrices of full rank r. The 
stationary  linear  combinations  ￿ ￿ b b b b - ￿￿   correspond  to  the  r  cointegrating  relations,  which 
represent the long-run relations that can be detected among the variables yt , whereas the 
elements in the columns of a a a a are the short-run adjustment coefficients of the variables to the 
equilibrium error from the previous period,  ￿ ￿ b b b b - ￿￿ . 
The deterministic terms, constants and trend, are important in the analysis in order to 
achieve an equilibrium error which has a zero mean. They play a double role within a VEC 
model, depending on how they are restricted between the cointegrating relations  ￿ ￿ b b b b - ￿￿  and 
the equations D ￿ ￿ . As Juselius (2006, pp. 95-100) shows, the vector of constants  ￿ m m m m , as well 
as the vector of parameters  ￿ m m m m , can be considered as the sum of two vectors, one accounting 
for the mean value of the relations  ￿ ￿ b b b b - ￿￿  and the other for the mean value of the equations 
D ￿ ￿ , as follows: 
 
(10)  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ m ab g m ab g m ab g m ab g m ab g m ab g m ab g m ab g = + = + . 
 
As a consequence the mean of the equilibrium error is given by  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b b b b b b b b b b b b - + + ￿￿  
and the mean of the equations is given by  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ g g g g g g g g D + ￿  
 
                                                 
4 All the results relative to the empirical analysis were obtained using CATS in RATS, version 2 (Dennis et al., 
2005).   5 
In terms of our interest in the international parity conditions, the strong form of the 
parities corresponds to a non significant constant term  ￿ b b b b  restricted to the cointegrating space 
and no linear trends in the variables, consistent with  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ . 
The weaker form can correspond either to a significant constant term  ￿ b b b b  restricted to 
the cointegrating space and no linear trends in the data, to or to a significant  ￿ b b b b  and no 




4.  The CVAR model for inflation rates, bond rates and ppp 
 





pppt], where the variables are observed monthly for t = 1999/I – 2008/VIII and are defined as: 
pt
*  = the logarithm of the "home" HICP price index, where "home" stands, in turn, for 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; 
pt
Eu  = the logarithm of the eurozone HICP price index; 
Rt
*  = the "home" annual long-term bond yield
5; 
Rt
Eu  = the euro-zone annual long-term bond yield; 
pppt  = pt
* -  pt
Eu - et , where et  is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate, defined as 
"home currency"/ Euro. 
The difference operator ￿12 applied to the log of the price indices gives a measure of 
the annual inflation rates
6. The price indices and the spot exchange rates series have been 
extracted from the European Central Bank data base, while the bond yields series have been 
extracted from IMF International Financial Statistics 
Prior  to  any  analysis  on  the  cointegration  properties  of  the  variables,  various 
misspecification tests have been performed, aiming to choose the proper number n of lags. 
These include the LM autocorrelation,  ARCH effects and Normality tests. 
As the samples cover a rather short number of years, the choice of r has been based on 
different criteria analyzed together, in order to make the choice as robust as possible: the trace 
test, the roots of the companion matrix for different values of r, the graphs representing the 





The specification search for the model relative to this country, after having controlled 
for extraordinary large observations with proper intervention dummies
7,  has given a number 
of lags n equal to 2. The determination of the cointegration rank is strictly connected with the 
choice  about  the  restrictions  on  the  vector  of  constant  terms  and  of  the  linear  trend 
parameters. The graphs of the observed series, given in the Appendix, show no clear linear 
trend in the variables and, when running long run variable exclusion tests in the cointegrating 
                                                 
5 First emissions of longer-term government bonds in the Visegrad-4 countries started at the end of  the Nineties, 
with a different timing for each county. For this reason we loose some observations differently at the beginning 
of each sample. 
6 We use HICP annual inflation rates because they are used by the European Central Bank in its Convergenge 
Reports. 
7 In order to obtain residuals close to Normality, in the Czech data set we introduced two permanent intervention 
dummies defined for 2003/VII and 2008/I   6 
relations, the results were in favour of the exclusion of a linear trend component at the 1% 
significant level. Therefore we chose a vector of constant terms restricted to the cointegrating 
space. 
The cointegration rank choice for the Czech Republic, as well as for the other three 
countries, has been dealt with by looking at as much as possible information coming from the 
data and not just on the basis of the formal trace test. The final choice is r = 1, which implies 
the empirical relevance of just one linear combination of the variables, that is just one parity, 
or a linear combination of the parities, is stationary. Therefore there are (p - r) = 4 common 
stochastic  trends  driving  the  system  variables,  that  is  the  system  is  characterized  by  four 
stochastic trends associated with shocks that need to be identified. 
Looking for the empirical relevant stationary relation we have proceeded by testing 
each possible relevant hypothesis of the form  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b H j b H j b H j b H j = . The results are in Table 1, where 
H1  and H2  test the stationarity of relative inflation and relative interest rates, H3  and H4  the 
Fisher parity conditions, H5  the real interest parity condition, H6  restricts the two inflation 
rates to have unitary coefficients and the nominal interest rates to have equal and opposite 
signs, H7  the relation between the real long-term interest rates, H8  to H14 the stationarity of 
the  same  relations  jointly  with  the  ppp  term,  H15  a  homogenous  relation  between  Czech 
inflation, eurozone inflation and the Czech bond rate, and H16  the same jointly with ppp.  
 





l R  
eu
l R   ppp  ( ) v
2 c   p-val. 
H1  1  -1  0  0  0  11.314 (4)  0.023 
H2  0  0  1  -1  0  19.248 (4)  0.001 
H3  1  0  -1  0  0  12.167 (4)  0.016 
H4  0  1  0  -1  0  21.605 (4)  0.000 
H5  1  -1  -1  1  0  8.541 (4)  0.074 
H6  1  -1  -1.123  1.123  0  8.290 (3)  0.040 
H7  1  -1.005  -1  1.005  0  8.350 (3)  0.039 
H8  1  -1  0  0  0.039  10.400 (3)  0.015 
H9  0  0  1  -1  0.060  14.261 (3)  0.003 
H10  1  0  -1  0  -0.065  9.216 (3)  0.027 
H11  0  1  0  -1  -0.031  20.861 (3)  0.000 
H12  1  -1  -1  1  -0.020  7.960 (3)  0.047 
H13  1  -1  -2.456  2.456  -0.102  2.140 (2)  0.343 
H14  1  -0.688  -1  0.688  -0.035  7.482 (2)  0.024 
H15  1  -0.515  -0.485  0  0  9.417 (3)  0.024 














Note: all relations are estimated with a constant 
  
As we can see from the p-values, only two hypotheses are significant at the 5% level, H5  and 
H13 . It's interesting to note that the real parity condition is accepted, though with a low p-
value.  With  just  one  stationary  relation  there  is  no  problem  of  identification,  anyway  we 
restricted  the  parameters  in  order  to  interpret  the  relation  in  terms  of  the  parities.  The   7 
estimation results are reported in Table 2.  
  
Table 2 : Structural representation for the cointegrating relation: Czech Republic 
 
Eigenvectors  b b b b  Weights a a a a 
Variable 
1 ˆ b b b b  
Equation  1 ˆ a a a a  
Cz
t p D  
1  2 Cz




t p D  
-1  2 eu
t p D  
0 
Cz












t R D  
0 
t ppp   -0.111 
(-7.027) 
t ppp D   0.508 
(2.912) 
constant  -0.370 
(-6.903) 
   
2
4 5 411,    0 248 . p value . c = - =  
Note: t-values in brackets 
 
The resulting cointegrating relation is of the following form: 
 
(11)  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ D - D - +  
 
It represents a variant of the real interest parity, in which full proportionality has not been 
imposed, parity which is largely accepted as stationary when the ppp term is included, that is 
when real exchange rate is taken into account. In other words, the two parities, a variant of the 
RIP and the PPP, result to be stationary when considered jointly. The significant constant 
term shows that the two parities considered, on average, maintain a certain distance over the 
sample period, in other words the equilibrium mean is different from zero. We could state that 
the convergence between the parities is just a relative one. 
The short run adjustment to (11) indicates that a positive equilibrium error adjusts 
significantly in the Czech inflation equation, significantly, but less strongly, in the Czech 
interest rate equation and significantly, and rather strongly, in the ppp equation. 
On the matrix a a a a have been imposed the weak exogeneity restrictions
8 as given in the 
last row of Table 1. The LR test on the overidentifying restrictions is equal to 5.411, with a 





The  specification  search  for  the  Hungarian  model,  after  having  controlled  for 
                                                 
8 The weak exogeneity restrictions take the form R'a a a a=0, where R is a (p ´ (p--s)) matrix with s ³ r. The LR test 
statistic is distributed as a  ￿ cr . A weakly exogenous variable is characterized by a corresponding zero row in a a a a, 
which means that the variable doesn't adjust to the long-run relations and can be considered as a common driving 
force in the system.   8 
extraordinary large observations with proper intervention dummies
9,  has given a number of 
lags n equal to 3. The graphs of the series in the Appendix show some linear trend in the 
variables and no exclusion test has rejected it. Therefore we chose a linear trend restricted to 
the cointegrating space and unrestricted constants. 
The cointegration rank final choice is still r = 1, which implies the empirical relevance 
of just one stationary linear combination of the parities, and  the existence of (p – r) = 4 
common  stochastic  trends  characterizing  the  system.  Looking  for  the  empirical  relevant 
stationary relation we have proceeded, as for the Czech Republic, by testing each possible 
relevant hypothesis of the form  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b H j b H j b H j b H j = . The testing results are in Table 3.  
 






l R  
eu
l R   ppp  ( ) v
2 c   p-val. 
H1  1  -1  0  0  0  17.177 (4)  0.002 
H2  0  0  1  -1  0  20.937 (4)  0.000 
H3  1  0  -1  0  0  14.673 (4)  0.005 
H4  0  1  0  -1  0  20.223 (4)  0.000 
H5  1  -1  -1  1  0  17.353 (4)  0.002 
H6  1  -1  -0.251  0.251  0  16.848 (3)  0.001 
H7  1  2.335  -1  -2.335  0  7.847 (3)  0.049 
H8  1  -1  0  0  1.112  6.912 (3)  0.075 
H9  0  0  1  -1  -2.786  9.895 (3)  0.019 
H10  1  0  -1  0  0.786  5.541 (3)  0.136 
H11  0  1  0  -1  3.943  9.939 (3)  0.019 
H12  1  -1  -1  1  1.284  7.298 (3)  0.063 
H13  1  -1  0.106  -0.106  1.111   6.787 (2)  0.034 
H14  1  2.301  -1  -2.301  0.400  0.404 (2)  0.817 
H15  1  2.288  -3.288  0  0  10.840 (3)  0.013 












(0.629)   
Note: all relations are estimated with a trend 
 
As we can see from the tests p-values, there are five hypotheses significant at the 5% 
level, H8 , H10 , H12 , H14  and H16 , all with the ppp term included. Having chosen, as more 
acceptable, a cointegration rank r = 1, we restricted the parameters of the single relation as in 
H14 . The estimation results are reported in Table 4. 
The cointegrating relation is of the following form: 
 
(12)  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - D - - D - +  
 
It represents a significant stationary empirical relation between the real interest parity and the 
                                                 
9  In  order  to obtain  residuals  close  to  Normality,  in  the  Hungarian  data  set  we  introduced  four  permanent 
intervention dummies defined for 2003/VI, 2005/I, 2006/VI and 2007/I.   9 
real  exchange  rate,  represented  by  the  ppp  term,  though  with  no  full  proportionality  as 
required by the RIP condition. To make the relation between the two parities stationary we 
need the trend component, whose coefficient is significant and negative, a clear signal that 
some convergence between them is in act over the sample period. 
 
Table 4  : Structural representation for the cointegrating relation: Hungary 
 
Eigenvectors  b b b b  Weights a a a a 
Variable 
1 ˆ b b b b   Equation  1 ˆ a a a a  
Hu
t p D   -1  2 Hu
t p D   0.119 
(6.401) 
eu
t p D   -2.088 
(-3.950) 
2 eu
t p D   0 
Hu
t R   1  Hu
t R D   0 
eu
t R   2.088 
(3.950) 
eu
t R D   0 
t ppp D   -0.358 
(-4.103) 
t ppp D   0 
trend  0.001 
(5.038) 
   
2
6 1 624,    0 951 . p value . c = - =  
Note: t-values in brackets 
 
The  short  run  adjustment  to  (12),  after  having  imposed  the  weak  exogeneity 
restrictions as given in the last row of Table 3, indicates that a positive equilibrium error 
adjusts  significantly  only  in  the  Hungarian  inflation  equation.  The  LR  test  on  all  the 
overidentifying restrictions is equal to 1.624, with a  0 951 - = p value . , therefore they  are 





The specification search for Poland, after having controlled for extraordinary large 
observations with proper intervention dummies
10,  has given a number of lags n equal to 2. 
The graphs of the series in the Appendix show some linear trend in the variables and no 
exclusion test has rejected it. Therefore we chose a linear trend restricted to the cointegrating 
space and unrestricted constants. 
The  cointegration  rank  final  choice  is  r  =  2,  which  implies  (p  –  r)  =  3  common 
stochastic trends characterizing the system, which is more theoretically acceptable than the 
preceding cases (Juselius, MacDonald, 2000a). Looking for the empirical relevant stationary 
relations  we  have  proceeded  by  testing  each  possible  relevant  hypothesis  of  the  form 
{ } ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b H j y b H j y b H j y b H j y = ,  that  is  we  test  the  stationarity  of  a  single  hypothetical  cointegrating 
relation, while leaving the remaining unrestricted. The relative results are in Table 5. 
As we can see from the tests p-values, there are four hypotheses significant at the 5% 
level, H9 ,  H10 , H13  and H16 , with H9 contained in H13 . No parity results stationary as such. 
The two more likely hypotheses for the identification of the two cointegrating relations  
                                                 
10 In order to obtain residuals close to Normality, in the Polish data set we introduced six permanent intervention 
dummies defined for 2001/VI, 2001/VII, 2001/VIII, 2002/V, 2005/IV and 2006/IX.   10 






l R  
eu
l R   ppp  ( ) v
2 c   p-val. 
H1  1  -1  0  0  0  15.713 (3)  0.001 
H2  0  0  1  -1  0  7.958 (3)  0.047 
H3  1  0  -1  0  0  7.211 (3)  0.065 
H4  0  1  0  -1  0  22.418 (3)  0.004 
H5  1  -1  -1  1  0  16.190 (3)  0.001 
H6  1  -1  -3.162  3.162  0   6.678 (2)  0.035 
H7  1  0.101  -1  -0.101  0  7.124 (2)  0.028 
H8  1  -1  0  0  -0.06  14.100 (2)  0.001 
H9  0  0  1  -1  -0.064  2.315 (2)  0.314 
H10  1  0  -1  0  0.032  5.099 (2)  0.078 
H11  0  1  0  -1  -0.030  21.987 (2)  0.000 
H12  1  -1  -1  1  0.032  15.417 (2)  0.000 
H13  1  -1  -3.568  3.568  0.171  0.563 (1)  0.453 
H14  1  0.170  -1  -0.170  0.035  4.852 (1)  0.028 
H15  1  0.153  -1.153  0  0  6.729 (2)  0.035 












(0.001)   
Note: all relations are estimated with a trend 
 
Table 6  : Structural representation for the cointegrating relations: Poland 
 
Eigenvectors  b b b b  Weights a a a a 
Variable 
1 ˆ b b b b   2 ˆ b b b b  
Equation  1 ˆ a a a a   2 ˆ a a a a  
Pl
t p D  
1  0  2 Pl






t p D  
-1  0  2 eu
t p D  
0  0 
Pl





















t ppp D  
0.127 
(5.152) 









     
2
5 2 606     0 760 . , p value . c = - =  
Note: t-values in brackets 
 
are H13  and H16 . The estimation results are reported in Table 6. 
The first cointegrating relation is the following:   11 
 
(13)  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D - D - - + +  
 
It is a significant stationary empirical relation very similar to the one characterizing the Czech 
Republic: it represents a variant of the real interest parity, in which full proportionality has not 
been imposed, parity which is accepted as stationary when PPP is analyzed jointly. To make 
the  relation  stationary  we  need  the  trend  component,  whose  coefficient  is  significant  and 
positive. If we had normalized on the interest rate spread the trend coefficient would have 
been negative, a clear indication of a convergence in act over the sample period. 
The second cointegrating relation, which, for identification reasons, looses the spread 
restriction, is the following: 
 
(14)  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = - +  
 
and represents a significant stationary empirical relation between the two nominal long-term 
interest rates. The trend component shows a significant and negative coefficient, a sign of a 
likely convergence in act. 
The short run adjustments to (13) and (14) after having imposed the weak exogeneity 
restrictions as given in the last row of Table 5, indicates that a positive equilibrium error in 
the first relation adjusts significantly in the Polish inflation equation and, less strongly, in the 
Polish  bond  yield  equation.  A  positive  equilibrium  error  in  the  second  relation  adjusts 
significantly in the Polish inflation equation and, less strongly in the eurozone bond yield 
equation. It adjusts also in the ppp equation. The LR test on all the overidentifying restrictions 





The specification search for Slovakia, after having controlled for extraordinary large 
observations with proper intervention dummies
11,  has given a number of lags n equal to 2. 
The graphs of the series in the Appendix show some linear trend in the variables and no 
exclusion test has rejected it. Therefore we chose a linear trend restricted to the cointegrating 
space and unrestricted constants. 
The cointegration rank final choice is still r = 2, which implies, as for Poland,  (p – r) 
= 3 common stochastic trends characterizing the system. Looking for the empirical relevant 
stationary relations we have proceeded by testing each possible relevant hypothesis of the 
form  { } ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b H j y b H j y b H j y b H j y = . The relative results are in Table 7. 
As we can see from the tests p-values, there are just two hypotheses significant at the 
5% level, H9 and H13 , with H9 contained in H13 . For identification reasons we leave the 
parameter associated with eurozone inflation unrestricted. The estimation results are reported 
in Table 8. 
The first cointegrating relation is the following: 
 
(15)  ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D - D - + + - +  
 
It represents a significant empirical relation among the inflation spread, the interest rates not  
                                                 
11 In order to obtain residuals close to Normality, in the  Slovakian data  set  we  introduced nine permanent 
intervention dummies defined for 2002/II, 2003/I, 2004/I, 2004/VIII, 2005/I, 2006/VII, 2006/IX, 2006/X and 
2007/I.   12 






l R  
eu
l R   ppp  ( ) v
2 c   p-val. 
H1  1  -1  0  0  0  9.175 (3)  0.027 
H2  0  0  1  -1  0  16.038 (3)  0.001 
H3  1  0  -1  0  0  9.942 (3)  0.019 
H4  0  1  0  -1  0  13.251 (3)  0.004 
H5  1  -1  -1  1  0  10.168 (3)  0.017 
H6  1  -1  0.698  -0.698  0  8.747 (2)  0.013 
H7  1  0.635  -1  -0.635  0  9.902 (2)  0.007 
H8  1  -1  0  0  2.941  6.396 (2)  0.041 
H9  0  0  1  -1  -0.597  3.980 (2)  0.137 
H10  1  0  -1  0  4.863  6.277 (2)  0.043 
H11  0  1  0  -1  -0.882  6.065 (2)  0.048 
H12  1  -1  -1  1  4.665  6.076 (2)  0.048 
H13  1  -1  4.558  -4.558  -2.000  2.168 (1)  0.141 
H14  1  -8.742  -1  8.742  6.479  5.588 (1)  0.018 
H15  1  -1.114  0.114  0  0  9.128 (2)  0.010 












(0.000)   
Note: all relations are estimated with a trend 
 
Table 8  : Structural representation for the cointegrating relations: Slovakia 
 
Eigenvectors  b b b b  Weights a a a a 
Variable 
1 ˆ b b b b   2 ˆ b b b b   Equation  1 ˆ a a a a   2 ˆ a a a a  
Sk
t p D   1  0  2 Sk
t p D   0  0 
eu
t p D   -1  -2.303 
(-3.769) 
2 eu





t R   8.526 
(5. 320) 
1  Sk





t R   -13.904 
(-4.281) 
-1  eu
t R D   0  0 












     
2
5 6 851     0 232 . , p value . c = - =  
Note: t-values in brackets 
 
restricted to have equal and opposite coefficients, and the real exchange rate. To make the 
relation stationary we need the trend component which results to be significant and negative. 
It is still a case where stationarity is recovered between a modified RIP and the PPP, if a trend   13 
component is added, indicating a significant convergence in act. 
The second cointegrating relation is the following: 
 
 
(16)  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - = D - + +  
 
and represents a significant empirical relation among the nominal interest rate spread, the 
eurozone inflation and the real exchange rate. The trend component shows a significant and 
positive coefficient. As (16) doesn't really represent a relation between parity conditions and 
the trend coefficient is the result of a combination of the series sample means, we cannot state 
anything in terms of convergence between parities. 
The short run adjustments to (15) and (16) after having imposed the weak exogeneity 
restrictions as given in the last row of Table 7, indicates that a positive equilibrium error in 
the first relation adjusts significantly, but rather slowly, in the eurozone inflation equation and 
in  the  Slovakian  interest  rate  equation,  and  significantly  in  the  ppp  equation.  A  positive 
equilibrium error in the second relation adjusts significantly only in the eurozone inflation 
equation. This adjustment dynamics leaves some questions open for further research. The LR 
test  on  all  the  overidentifying  restrictions  is  equal  to  6.851,  with  a  0 232 - = p value . , 
therefore they are accepted. 
 
 
5.  The long-run effects of cumulated shocks 
 
  Interesting information on the effects of cumulated shocks to the system variables 
can  be  gained  from  the  inverted  CVAR  (9),  yielding  the  vector  moving  average  (VMA) 
representation  for  ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Rewriting  it  in  terms  of  the  levels  of  the  variables  by  recursive 
substitution and  focusing the attention just on the non-stationary components of the VMA 








￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ m F m F m F m F
= =
= + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 
we note that it's characterized by the (p ´ p) matrix C. The existence of r cointegrating vectors 
implies that C has reduced rank given by (p - r). It's interesting to show that it can be written 
as  b a b a b a b a ^ ^ = ￿ ￿ ￿ , a decomposition similar to that relative to P P P P
12. 
  The matrix C plays an important role: its rank correspond to the number of driving 
forces or common stochastic trends and its elements convey information about the long-run 
impact of cumulated shocks to the system variables. In other words, the matrix C allows us to 
determine which empirical shocks have permanent effects on the system variables.  
 
For the Czech Republic the rank of the matrix C is equal to four, that is there are four 
common  stochastic  trends  characterizing  the  system.  Two  of  them  can  be  identified  as 
cumulated shocks to the weakly exogenous variables, the eurozone inflation and the eurozone 
                                                 
12 In the decomposition 
￿ ￿ ￿ b b a b b b a b b b a b b b a b
-








= - + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and b b b b^  and a a a a^  are (p ´ (p - 
r)) orthogonal matrices, defined by a a a a a a a a^ = ￿ ￿ and b b b b b b b b^ = ￿ ￿ .   14 
interest rate, while, from the a a a a ^ ￿ matrix
13,  we have that the other two are given by cumulated 
shocks to the Czech interest rate with some, borderline significant, contribution from the ppp 
term, and by cumulated shocks to the Czech inflation rate with some contribution from the 
ppp term. From the estimate of the matrix C in Table 9, we note significant effects, with 
opposite sign, of cumulative shocks to the two interest rates on the ppp term, a clear signal 
that exchange rates are involved in capital movements (Hoover et al., 2008, p. 255). There are 
some significant effects of shocks to the Czech inflation on the Czech interest rate and of 
shocks to the eurozone inflation on the Czech inflation. 
 
Table 9  : The estimate of the long-run C matrix: Czech Republic 
 
  Cz p D e ￿   eu p D e ￿   Cz
l R e ￿   eu
l R e ￿   ppp e ￿  
           
0.751  1.408  1.884       -0.510     0.037  Cz p D   (3.373)    (3.253)  (1.982)  (-0.662)  (0.670) 
-0.047     1.133     -0.318       0.420      0.018  eu p D   (-0.473)  (5.922)  (-0.757)  (1.234)  (0.726) 
0.248      0.408      1.167       0.736     -0.042  Cz
l R   (2.048)  (1.736)  (2.260)  (1.758)  (-1.401) 
-0.014     0.282     -0.032       1.377     -0.001  eu
l R  
(-0.181)  (1.886)  (-0.098)  (5.186)  (-0.050) 
1.226     -0.406     -7.428       6.205      1.112  ppp  
(1.656)  (-0.282)  (-2.351)  (2.424)  (6.018) 
 
Also  for  Hungary  the  rank  of  the  matrix  C  is  equal  to  four.  The  four  common 
stochastic  trends  can  be  identified  as  cumulated  shocks  to  the  four  weakly  exogenous 
variables. As we can see from the estimate of matrix C in Table 10, cumulative shocks to the 
Hungarian inflation have no long-run effects on the other variables, while it is significantly 
and negatively affected by cumulated shocks to eurozone inflation, positively by shocks to 
eurozone interest rate and negatively by shocks to the ppp term. The ppp term results to be 
significantly and positively affected by shocks to the Hungarian interest rate.  
 
Table 10 : The estimate of the long-run C matrix: Hungary 
 
  Hu p D e ￿   eu p D e ￿   Hu
l R e ￿   eu
l R e ￿   ppp e ￿  
           
0.000  -1.971    0.032       2.632    -0.367  Hu p D   (0.000)  (-2.307)    (0.057)   (2.460)  (-3.280) 
0.000  1.233      0.035       -0.310     0.022  eu p D   (0.000)  (4.266)     (0.187)     (-0.857)  (0.573) 
0.000  0.058      1.061       0.321     -0.031  Hu
l R   (0.000)  (0.141)     (3.971)      (0.621)  (-0.567) 
0.000  0.140      -0.044       1.104     -0.004  eu
l R  
(0.000)  (0.693)    (-0.334)     (4.377)  (-0.168) 
0.000  -0.706      2.416       1.793      0.786  ppp  
(0.000)  (-0.548)    (2.896)      (1.111)    (4.658) 
                                                 
13 The a a a a^  matrices are not reported but available upon request.   15 
For  Poland the rank of the matrix C is equal to three. One of the three common 
stochastic trends can be identified as cumulated shocks to the weakly exogenous eurozone 
inflation, while, from the  a a a a ^ ￿ matrix, we have that the other two are given by cumulated 
shocks to the eurozone interest rate with some, almost insignificant, contribution from the 
Polish inflation, and by cumulated shocks to the Polish interest rate with contribution from the 
ppp term and with some, almost insignificant contribution, from the Polish inflation. From the 
estimate of the matrix C, we note some significant effects of cumulative shocks to the Polish 
inflation on the two interest rates, significant effects of shocks to the eurozone inflation on the 
Polish inflation and significant effects of shocks to the Polish interest rates on the ppp term. 
  
Table 11 : The estimate of the long-run C matrix: Poland 
 
  Pl p D e ￿   eu p D e ￿   Pl
l R e ￿   eu
l R e ￿   ppp e ￿  
           
0.730      1.255      -0.174       3.031     -0.068  Pl p D   (1.553)    (2.696)  (-0.169)     (1.931)  (-0.730) 
0.164      1.031      0.548       -0.498     0.060  eu p D   (0.732)    (4.641)     (1.110)     (-0.664)    (1.347) 
0.879      0.007      1.215       0.222      0.101  Pl
l R   (2.309)    (0.022)     (1.582)      (0.202)    (1.554) 
0.424  0.012  0.508  0.270  0.039  eu
l R  
(2.371)  (0.078)  (1.406)  (0.520)  (1.283) 
4.561  -0.365  18.126  -19.683  2.049  ppp  
(1.207)  (-0.097)  (2.180)  (-1.559)  (2.718) 
 
Also for Slovakia the rank of the matrix C is equal to three. Two of the three common 
stochastic trends can be identified as cumulated shocks to the weakly exogenous Slovakian 
inflation and eurozone interest rate, while, from the  a a a a ^ ￿ matrix, we have that the other is 
given by cumulated shocks to the Slovakian interest rate with a significant contribution from 
the ppp term. From the estimate of the matrix C in Table 12, we note that the ppp term is the 
most affected by cumulative shocks, in particular to the two interest rates, with opposite sign, 
and to the Slovakian inflation. Eurozone inflation results to be affected by the two interest 
rates, negatively by the eurozone bond yield, coherent with the theory, and positively by the 
Slovakian interest rate. 
 
Table 12 : The estimate of the long-run impact matrix C: Slovakia 
 
  Sk p D e ￿   eu p D e ￿   Sk
l R e ￿   eu
l R e ￿   ppp e ￿  
           
1.162     -0.013     0.225       -0.644  0.024  Sk p D   (14.923)  (-0.024)    (0.233)     (-1.250)  (0.175) 
0.069   -0.080     1.414       -0.972     0.150  eu p D   (1.570)  (-0.268)    (2.571)     (-3.325)  (1.931) 
-0.056     -0.097     1.709       0.695     0.181  Sk
l R   (-0.831)  (-0.213)    (2.039)      (1.561)  (1.532) 
-0.005     -0.028     0.488       0.920     0.052  eu
l R  
(-0.132)  (-0.111)    (1.068)      (3.787)  (0.802) 
0.452     -0.247     4.365       -4.318     0.462  ppp  
(2.938)  (-0.238)    (2.279)     (-4.243)  (1.712)   16 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
 
In the paper we have examined the existence of inflation rate and interest rate linkages 
between the eurozone and each of the Visegrad-4 countries, during the last ten years, a period 
that has seen a remarkable appreciation of their currencies with respect to the euro. This was 
done  by  trying  to  identify  whether  some  key  international  parity  conditions,  such  as 
purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity and real interest parity, show some 
evidence on their own or, at least, jointly, through some meaningful long-run equilibrium 
relations combining the parities. The empirical analysis based on the cointegrated VAR model 
gave some interesting results, interpretable also in terms of convergence, or convergence in 
act, between the eurozone economy and each economy in turn. 
According to the literature, in our system made up by five variables we would have 
expected to find two long-run stationary cointegrating relations and three common stochastic 
trends  driving  the  system.  The  results  have  been  quite  different,  because  for  The  Czech 
Republic  and  Hungary  we  found  just  one  long-run  relation  and  four  common  stochastic 
trends, while for Poland and Slovakia we found two long-run relations and three common 
stochastic trends, as expected. 
For  the  Czech  Republic,  the  identified  long-run  equilibrium  relation  represents  a 
variant of the real interest parity, which is largely accepted as stationary when the ppp term is 
included, that is when real exchange rate is taken into account. The significant constant term 
characterizing the relation shows that the two parities, on average, maintain a certain distance 
over the sample period, therefore the convergence between the parities is just a relative one. 
Of the four common stochastic trends, two are identified as shocks to the weakly exogenous 
variables, the eurozone inflation and bond rate, and two as a combination of shocks to the 
Czech inflation and to the ppp term, and as a combination of shocks to the Czech bond rate 
and to the ppp term.  
For Hungary, the identified long-run equilibrium relation represents a combination of 
the real interest parity and of the purchasing power parity, though not with full proportionality 
as required by the RIP condition. To make the relation between the two parities stationary 
there is a trend component, whose coefficient is a clear signal that some convergence between 
them is in act over the sample period. The four common stochastic trends are identified as 
shocks to the four weakly exogenous variables, the eurozone inflation and bond rate, the 
Hungarian bond rate and the ppp term. 
For Poland, one of the two identified long-run relations is very similar to the one 
characterizing the Czech Republic, a variant of the real interest parity combined with the 
purchasing power parity, but, instead of a significant constant, we have a significant trend 
component, a clear indication of a convergence in act. The other identifies a long-run relation 
between  the  two  nominal  bond  rates,  with  a  significant  trend  component  indicating  a 
convergence in act. The three common stochastic trends are identified as shocks to the weakly 
exogenous eurozone inflation, as cumulated shocks to the eurozone interest rate with some 
contribution from the Polish inflation, and as cumulated shocks to the Polish interest rate with 
contribution from the ppp term and from the Polish inflation 
For  Slovakia,  one  of  the  two  identified  long-run  relations  is  still  a  case  where 
stationarity is recovered between a modified RIP and the PPP, if a trend component is added, 
indicating a significant convergence in act. The other identifies a significant empirical relation 
among the nominal interest rate spread, the eurozone inflation and the real exchange rate, but 
it  doesn't  really  represent  a  relation  between  parity  conditions.  In  this  case  the  trend 
coefficient cannot be interpreted in terms of convergence between parities. The three common 
stochastic trends are identified as shocks to the two weakly exogenous Slovakian inflation and 
eurozone interest rate, while the other is given by cumulated shocks to the Slovakian interest 
rate with contribution from the ppp term.   17 
The overall analysis is quite satisfying in terms of meaningful long-run equilibrium 
relations, emerging when analyzing the stochastic behaviour of the variables of interest: the 
international parity conditions seem to play a certain role in pulling the variables of each 
Visegrad-4 countries economy towards a convergence with the corresponding variables of the 
eurozone  economy.  Some  dissatisfaction  regards  the  pushing  or  driving  forces,  whose 
identification didn't lead to the expected common stochastic trends that should have driven 
each system of variables according to the economic literature. Further research is needed in 
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Appendix: The data 
 
Graph 1 : Data in levels for the Czech Republic  
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Graph 2 : Data in levels for Hungary  
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Graph 3 : Data in levels for Poland 
















Graph 4 : Data in levels for Slovakia 
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Graph 5 : Data in levels for the eurozone  
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$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ (￿￿￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ +2 ￿￿￿
￿￿￿3 ￿￿-￿4 /￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿1￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿￿
￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
.￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿:￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿%￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
0￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ > ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿ " ￿&" ￿￿" ￿6￿￿￿ $￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿’￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿%-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿￿ -￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ #-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿  ￿&￿￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿
)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿’￿1￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿*￿ 2￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ +￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ? ,￿￿￿(￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿9￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿:￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿
1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’-￿￿￿ ￿￿.0 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ? *￿ ￿ ￿￿ / @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ A ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’-￿￿￿ ￿￿.0 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿? *￿ ￿ ￿￿/ / @ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
.> ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ &￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿6￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿/￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿ 3￿￿ !￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ (￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ .￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿￿￿￿
#￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿’￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ !￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ; ￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<
%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿*￿2￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (/ ￿￿.￿ ￿1-.￿ 7 B B ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿3 =￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿9￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿) ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿:￿ 3￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ &#*￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ $￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 .0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ &￿ ￿￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.> ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿
)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿  ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿
.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ &￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ $￿￿ ,￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ ’￿ >￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿8￿-￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ *￿￿￿ ￿￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ) ￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ . ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ 9￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ :￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿. $"￿
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ &￿￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿/￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ C 3￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿
￿￿￿ .￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ . ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿-￿4 /￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿&￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿*￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿’￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ &￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
#￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿%-￿D￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’￿*￿2￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿"4 ￿3 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿





￿￿ ￿ ’￿:￿ !￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 " ￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
*￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿)  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿F￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿&￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿@￿￿-￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(!￿? ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿@ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿*￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿9￿ / ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿:￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿6￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿￿ > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿3￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿  ￿6￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ &￿2￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ’￿1￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿6￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿￿ ￿￿&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ *￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ 9￿#￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ :￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 1￿ ￿￿ ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ )  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
-￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ -￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
.%￿-￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿￿￿1￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 7￿￿ )￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿$￿￿ *￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿.0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿&￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ *￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿ ￿ *￿￿’￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿*￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿/￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿9￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿)  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿:￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0  ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿
)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ "-￿￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.!￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿6￿￿) ￿￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿&  3￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿’ %￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , 7￿￿)￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿* 1￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿? ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿, 
7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿9  ,￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿:￿#￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿ ￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ *￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿￿ -￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿) ￿ $￿￿%￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿  ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ A ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ 2￿￿￿ -￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ,￿￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ &￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿.0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿/￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ *￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ .0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ 9￿ ’-￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ !￿￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ :￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿B ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿
￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿! ! ￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿￿ *￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿! ! ￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿/￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿&￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+/ -.&￿￿#￿













































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿